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Abstract
Theory: Despite its controversial status as a stable governmental form, many of today=s
societies attempting to make the transition to democracy have or will, for a variety of reasons, choose
presidentialism. Meanwhile, the evidence suggests that the combination of presidentialism and
multipartism is especially dangerous for democratic stability (Mainwaring 1994). The question this
essay addresses, though, is whether presidential elections themselves serve to encourage a fragmented
party system, at least in the initial stages of democratization.
Hypothesis: In transitional political systems presidential elections encourage party
fragmentation, but in a way different from that of highly proportional purely parliamentary
mechanisms. Specifically, parties proliferate to support the presidential aspirations of political elites.
Methods: Multivariate regression analysis on cross-sectional aggregate electoral data,
supported by extensive outliers diagnostics and assessments of the role of country-specific effects.
A nested model is used to discriminate among the secondary hypotheses. Controls include:
parliamentary election rules (district magnitude, threshold for representation, adjustment districts,
ballot structure), relative timing of presidential and parliamentary elections, and basic societal
cleavage structure.
Results: Using as our data source the recent experiences of Central Europe and the European
part of the former Soviet Union, we show that presidential elections consistently significantly increase
party fragmentation. At the same time, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that presidentialism
does encourage the overall consolidation in party systems through voters= abandonment of some
parties, akin to Duverger=s >psychological effect.=
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Although we might dispute specifics, there is clear evidence that presidentialism has not been
a notably successful democratic governmental form, at least in comparison to parliamentary systems:
"the analytically separable propensities of presidentialism ... work to impede democratic consolidation
(Stepan and Scatch, 1993; see also Linz 1994, but see Horowitz 1992). A variety of explanations
have been offered for this fact, but perhaps the most compelling is the one offered by Jones and
others; namely that "While the optimal number of parties ... can be debated, once the presidential form
of government is chosen there can be no debate. High levels of multipartism most often lead to
disastrous consequences" (Jones 1995, p. 10; see also Mainwaring 1993, Mainwaring and Scully
1995). But generally these explanations treat presidentialism and multipartism as independent
characteristics of a polity in which the extent of party fragmentation depends on other variables such
as the magnitude of legislative election districts, the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections,
underlying social cleavages, and the extent to which parliamentary elections aspire to perfect
proportionality (Rae 1971, Lijphart 1994, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Ordeshook and Shvetsova
1994, Cox 1997). What is less well understood is the relationship itself between multipartism and
direct election of a president. Of course, the relationship that first suggests itself is the one set forth
by Duverger (1954); that the majoritarian methods inherent in the direct election of a president should
have a consolidating influence on parties. This inference, though, implies something that seems at
odds with the data; namely, that presidential systems should contain within themselves a corrective
for whatever other disadvantages they possess. Here, in fact, we argue that the impact of direct
presidential elections in at least transitional democratic states will be to increase multipartism and,
thereby, render presidentialism especially vulnerable to disruption in the early stages of transition.
Despite the fact that Duverger's (1954) arguments about party consolidation and the influences of
3majoritarian electoral systems appears to apply best to a governmental form that requires competition
for the prize of a singularly important office, there are reasons for believing that those arguments need
not apply to transitional democratic systems. Even if we allow for the possibility that the choice of
majority over plurality rule might attenuate the consolidating influence of direct election of president
(Cox 1997), those arguments, along with their formal theoretical elaborations (Palfrey 1989,
Fedderson 1992), focus on political systems in equilibrium rather than on the paths to equilibria. Most
such theoretical work looks only at systems characterized by voters with well-established
expectations about the viability of new parties and with reasonably well-defined preferences over
policy, as well as by political elites who know the issues that concern voters and patterns of electoral
preference over those issues. But transitional democracies, by definition, do not satisfy these
preconditions. Similarly, most comparative empirical assessments of the impact of election laws on
party structures (see Rae 1971, Lijphart 1990, 1994, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, Shugart and Carey 1992) employ data from stable political systems or systems that
have been in operation for some time. Typically, such analyses discard data from elections
immediately following establishment of a new regime or give equal weight to all data in some long
sequence of elections, thereby compromising their relevance to transitional democracies. Thus, n ither
theoretical nor empirical research resolves the issue of whether the influence of presidentialism in the
form of direct presidential elections is `monotonic' -- whether it induces party consolidation at every
stage of democratic development or whether it can, during the crucial early stages of it, retard party
consolidation by encouraging more parties and candidacies than we might otherwise expect were the
system a purely parliamentary one.1  This concern is important since many of the states attempting
to become democracies have, for various reasons, implemented a directly elected president. Those
states cannot look to `long run equilibria' but must worry instead about the current structure of parties
and the impact of that structure on stability. This concern is important also because its resolution may
shed light on the ongoing debate between proponents of presidentialism and parliamentary
                                         
     1 Throughout this essay we generally equate `presidentialism' with political systems with a directly elected (i.e., non-
legislatively appointed) head of state. Al hough the common definition of a presidential or mixed system considers other
institutional variables (see, for example, Shugart and Carey 1992), our concern is with electoral incentives to the party-
creating elites, and we do not discriminate among the variety of presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary power
allocations compatible with the directly elected office of the president.
4government. If presidentialism is an unstable governmental form when combined with fragmented
parties and if the path to party consolidation under it passes through a period of fragmentation that
exceeds what we might expect, cet ris paribus, under a parliamentary form, then we can reasonably
hypothesize that the comparative stability of presidential regimes depends critically on whatever other
institutional choices can be made to encourage party consolidation.
1. Some Initial Evidence
Before proceeding too far, however, it is useful to take a quick look at some data in evidence
of the proposition that direct presidential elections do not encourage party consolidation. Consider,
in particular, those post-communist Central European and ex-Soviet states that have most recently
attempted the transition to democracy (see the Appendix for the countries and elections in our
sample, data sources, and a description of the coding and calculation of various key variables). If we
simply regress a count of parties (the number with at least one percent of the vote in a parliamentary
election) against a dummy variable that indicates whether the country has direct presidential elections,
then for at least this sample of countries, we find a significant positive relationship between direct
election of a president and the number of parties. Specifically, if we let N = number of parties with
at least 1% of the vote in a parliamentary election and P = 1 if there is a directly elected president and
0 otherwise, then we get (t-statistics in parenthesis),
N = 9.5 (11.4)+ 3.2 (2.8)P,2
with an adjusted R2 of .17. This relationship, moreover, does not disappear if we control for the
variables usually considered in empirical studies of the relationship between election laws and party
fragmentation -- the magnitude of legislative electoral districts (D), the presence or absence of
adjustment districts (AD), and societal heterogeneity (H) -- or if we use the more common measure
of party fragmentation, the `effective' number of parties, EN.3 As Table 1 shows, a directly elected
                                         
     2 The data analysis presented in this paper was conducted using the SST package. In this and all subsequent
regressions we computed heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors using White=s (1980) method.
     3 Following Ordeshook and Shvetsova's (1994) analysis of the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, H, on the number of
parties, along with Neto and Cox's (1997) reconfirmation that an interactive model best fits the data and theory, Table 1
incorporates H by multiplying it times ln(D).
5president has its own positive and highly statistically significant influence on the number of parties
that compete for legislative seats.
     Of course, the number of observations in Table 1 is not great (n = 34). And since most countries
in our sample are represented by more than one observation, one could suppose that the statistical
pattern portrayed there can be influenced by the idiosyncratic characteristics of countries (i.e.,
country-specific effects), other variables (e.g., the timing of presidential and legislative elections and
the rules for electing a president4), and endogenous institutional selection (i.e., an existing proto-party
system that influences the choice of presidential versus parliamentary governmental forms). In fact,
though, the coefficients for P in Table 1 are relatively robust. For example,
- If, to eliminate the country-specific effects allowed by multiple observations from each
country, we take only one election per country (the second, because >f unding= elections are
considered suspect due to their plebiscite nature) we get
N = 6.2 (6.1) + 3.4P ( .0) + .35D (6.1),   (t-statistics in parentheses),
adjR2 = .74. Even though this regression considers only 12 observations, the coefficient on
P remains positive and significant.
- An alternative treatment of country-specific effects is to include country-specific dummy
variables. But here we encounter the problem that such variables are highly correlated with
P since most countries do not switch between regime types. As a substitute, we can consider
several alternative by-country partitions of the data. Table 2, which considers only Central
European states (i.e., excludes the five ex-Soviet republics in our sample -- Russia, Ukraine,
Armenia, Moldova and Georgia, but not the Baltic states) reports the result of one such
partition, and shows that as before, the coefficient on P remains positive and significant. 
                                         
     4All countries in our sample use majority with a runoff, so we cannot examine the influence of this institutional
characteristic versus the alternative of simple plurality rule (e.g., as in Taiwan). However, the systems in our sample do
differ to the extent that some (e.g., Russia), use two separate ballots for electing the national legislature -- one for the
single member constituencies and one for those elected on party lists. If we let TB be a dummy variable that indicates
simultaneous use within an electoral system of PR and single-member districts, then we get
N = 5.4 (3.8) + 3.5P (4.1) + .30D (3.3) + 3.1AD (2.7) - .81TB (-.6),
and adjR2 = .41 (t-statistics in parentheses). So as with our other tests of robustness, the coefficient on P remains
positive and significant despite this additional control.
6- Both Shugart and Carey (1992) and Neto and Cox (1997) suggest the importance of the
timing of presidential versus parliamentary elections. Presumably, if direct presidential
elections are consolidating, that consolidating influence should be greatest when elections are
concurrent. In our sample of countries, though, states with concurrent elections actually have
a higher average number of parties. Indeed, even though meaningful statistical comparisons
are precluded by the size of our data set, even after we control for D and AD, the coefficient
on P is greatest for concurrent systems (4.7 versus 2.8).5
- We should not wholly dismiss the argument (see, for example, Gebethner 1996) that prior
political formations are important determinants of the choice between presidentialism and
parliamentary government. But insofar as our sample is concerned, the initial bargaining over
institutional forms took place most commonly between ruling communists and a relatively
unified democratic opposition. In general the choice to elect a president directly was made
before the two sides to these negotiations divided and recombined into what we now identify
and count as `parties.' Sometimes, as in Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia, it was supported by the
reform forces as a method of transferring power from the communists, while in Ukraine,
Armenia, Georgia and Slovenia it was to add legitimacy to the bid for independence.6
Moreover, these early institutional choices tended to be resistant to change, as seen in the
failed 1997 Slovak campaign to introduce direct presidential elections and the 1995 Albanian
constitutional referendum on strengthening presidential power.
An important issue is that of what we mean by a >p rty= in the context of post-communist
transitions. The concept of a party there is difficult to pin down or to distinguish from a `movement',
                                         
     5 More specifically, defining CP + NCP = P, where CP  takes the value of 1 when presidential elections were held
concurrently with parliamentary, and NCP takes the value of 1 when presidential elections were non-concurrent, the
resulting model is:
N = 4.9(3.1) + 4.7CP(3.5) + 2.8NCP(2.9) + .32D(3.2) + 3.3AD(2.7),
adjR2 = .43 (t-statistics in parentheses). The test of restrictions does not allow us to reject a hypothesis that the two
coefficients are equal. In any case, the consolidating influence of concurrent elections is not found in the transitional
sample, while the conclusion opposite to it might be supported in the future by more extensive data.
     6 At times, the decision was arrived to almost by chance. In Hungary, where presidential elections were sponsored
by reform communists, a popular referendum approved directly elected presidency, but fell short of the turnout
requirement.
7`faction', or `association'. To explore in depth the varied meaning of >party= in transitional polities, a
coherent collection of case studies would be required. However, because our concern is primarily
with political entrepreneurial strategies, we can use the simplest definition of multipartism--as a
degree of political fragmentation as it is manifested on the ballot and in the vote. Additionally, there
is also the problem of regime classification. Moldova, for example, is a country where presidents are
elected directly. But even though its first presidential election took place before its only parliamentary
election to-date, it was of a one-candidate kind and could not ignite the elite competition. The
decision that we make (to code Moldova as a country with presidential elections) is based on the
general assumption that eventual competitive election would most likely have been anticipated by
political elites at the time of a parliamentary campaign. Unable to include a more in-depth case
discussion here, we proceed with a further analysis of the cross-country data, and consider several
alternative explanations for why popular presidentialism in general might initially retard party system
development, regardless of the form of government -- explanations that allow for some subsidiary
testable implications.
2. Coordination in Transitional Parliamentary Elections
Insofar as we can summarize the conclusions we reach in this essay, we note that although
we do not debate whether a presidential or parliamentary system is most suitable for a transition to
democracy (see instead Linz and Valenzuela 1994, Linz 1990, and Horowitz 1992), as a partial
explanation for presidentialism's spotty record we do question whether direct presidential elections
should be expected to encourage party consolidation in the initial stages of a transition. We argue that
the coefficients in Tables 1 and 2 are not statistical artifacts and that direct election of a president will,
in general, encourage the proliferation of parties over and above what one would expect were we to
look only at parliamentary electoral incentives. On the other hand, our analysis does reveal that the
precise character of that proliferation is not inconsistent with a more complex conceptualization of
consolidation -- a conceptualization that allows for the simultaneous increase in the absolute number
8of parties but a decrease in the number of strong contestants reflected by a decline in the `effective'
number of parties.
To understand how a directly elected president might impede the process of party
consolidation in a transitional democracy, recall that Duverger's (1954) argument about the
consolidating influence of majoritarian electoral laws rests on two pillars: (1) voters who cast
strategic ballots because they are unwilling to waste their votes on candidates or parties who cannot
win, and (2) party leaders who believe that merging their political organizations improves their
chances for electoral success. Nearly by definition, though, neither of these pillars exerts much force
in a transitional democracy. The first pillar makes its contribution only if the following four conditions
are satisfied: (1) voters must be able to rank-order candidates or parties to form consistent
preferences or at least be able to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable alternatives; (2)
there should be some minimal level of agreement as to which parties or candidates have a reasonable
chance of >winning= and which do not; (3) at least for the viable and acceptable alternatives, a voter
needs to have some confidence in his or her ability to rank the candidates from most-likely-to-win to
least-likely-to-win; and (4) voters need a relevant definition of what >w n ing= me ns. There are other
requirements that might not be satisfied in a transitional democracy, such as an understanding of the
operation of electoral rules, but to see some of the problems of strategic voting when the preceding
four conditions are not met, suppose an election among three candidates, A, B, and C, is decided by
simple plurality rule and suppose each voter has one of three possible preferences:
type 1 type 2 type 3
1st preference A C B
2nd preference B B C
3rd preference C A A
If everyone knows everyone else's preferences, and if, say, they know that 45% of the electorate is
of type 1, 40% of type 2 and 15% of type 3, then it seems reasonable to suppose that, unless they are
9nearly indifferent between A and C, type 3 voters will vote strategically for C. Otherwise, under
plurality rule, their last choice, A, wins. Type 2 voters (those who most prefer C) might contemplate
casting a strategic ballot for B, but the knowledge that C has almost as good a chance to win as A
is likely to lead to the expectation among all voters that C is more likely to receive the necessary
strategic votes to defeat A than is B. Type 2 voters, then, should vote sincerely for C. On its own,
then, the electorate is likely to pare the list of viable candidates down to two, A and C, and if B insists
on remaining in the competition, its support should diminish to the point that its vote is incorporated
into the category `other' in semi-official summaries of ballot returns.
Now suppose the election is marked by greater uncertainty and that no voter knows much
about the preferences of anyone else, aside from knowing that A has an advantage over B and C. In
this instance it is difficult to say whether type 2 or 3 voters should vote strategically. B and C each
might win if they can convince their voters to be sincere and a reasonable share of their opponent's
supporters to be strategic. Indeed, we can now envision a situation in which voters of each type
contemplate voting strategically, with candidates no longer arguing over policy but instead
preoccupying themselves with manipulating biased or wholly fraudulent polls that attempt to establish
one or another as unelectable. In this environment, then, type 2 and 3 voters must somehow find a
way to coordinate their actions before we would predict that strategic voting can pare d w  the list
of viable candidates.
The things that facilitate coordination among voters in an established democracy include
electoral histories that allow voters to estimate the approximate range of support for one party (or
candidate) or another, experience with campaign tactics that allow them to discriminate between
potentially successful versus unsuccessful tactics and platforms, and a variety of indirect cues
(endorsements from trusted public figures and organizations, newspaper editorials, and public opinion
polls with reliable track records) that allow them to estimate the ebb and flow of support as a
campaign proceeds (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985). But in a transitional system, beliefs about
relative viability of parties are, almost by definition, less well formed. This is especially true if, in the
early stages of party system development, numerous `parties' appear ideologically indistinguishable.
Although voters with similar ideological or policy preferences might not care which one of similar
>parties= emerges as the primary advocate of their position, actions that strengthen their representation
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require something that coordinates them to the same choice. However, it is the absence of that
coordinating influence that is characteristic for the post-communist transitional democracies.7
Insofar as Duverger's second pillar is concerned -- the consolidation of parties via the
incentives that operate on political elites -- if voters can coordinate and if they are more likely to
coordinate to a pre-existing party, then there are reduced incentives for new parties to form and
compete at ideological positions currently staked out by existing parties. But once it is known that
voters cannot coordinate, the motives of political elites are such that entry is encouraged and
consolidation discouraged. Suppose there are N ideologically indistinguishable candidates (for
president or other office), and suppose each of them, absent effective coordination among voters,
anticipates an expected vote of 1/Nth among those likely to support the corresponding ideology. In
addition, owing to the weak, even nonexistent, partisan attachments of voters (Rose 1995), suppose
a candidate cannot `deliver' his vote to any specific opponent, so that the only consequence of
dropping out is that each of the remaining policy-equivalent candidates anticipates receiving 1/(N-1)th
of the total. Thus, aside from avoiding the cost of campaigning, there is little incentive to withdraw:
any candidate who remains should pay little if anything for the exiting candidate's withdrawal and
endorsement, because all candidates vying for the claim to be the leader of the respective ideological
position gain as much from his withdrawal as anyone else.  The withdrawal, then, merely generates
a public good that in this particular political market is likely to be under supplied. Indeed, rather than
provide incentives for consolidation, our scenario encourages the opposite. Absent costly barriers to
                                         
     7 Of course, not all democratic transitions exhibit the problem of coordination to the same degree. Loyalties to pre-
authoritarian parties or non-political associations can coordinate voters in a new regime (Geddes 1995). But, with
respect to the countries in our study, the communist regimes rarely left behind any non-political societal associations of
electorally relevant size that could provide alternative means of coordination. Indeed, as is often the case following the
destruction of these regimes, new parties are merely splinter groups drawn from some all-encompassing democratic
opposition -- groups that better reflect the egos of those who form them than anything else (Jasiewiecz 1993, 1994,
Shafir 1995).
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entry, new candidates should enter; they are as likely to win as anyone else or re at least as likely to
be able to claim championship of the corresponding ideology.8
With these ideas as background, we now turn our attention to the more specific issue of why
electing a president per se might retard the consolidation of parties and encourage fragmentation. We
begin by supposing that a transitional system is endowed with some general potential supply of parties
in the form of elites willing to forge political organizations to further their own ends. The magnitude
of that supply may depend on things unrelated to political structure (e.g., ethnic heterogeneity, the
economy, the availability of a mass media and the cost of campaigning), but suppose this number is
greater than what a political system can normally sustain. With the weak or nonexistent partisan
attachments that characterize a transitional democracy (Rose 1995), and with few politically relevant
societal structures able to either transform themselves into parties or play a coordinating role in
campaign and elections, publicly visible personalities become the sole means of coordinating voters
at the polls. Moreover, due to the coordination problem on the voters= side, the a priori chances of
success are non-zero for any such personality. As a consequence, there can be initially many more
political aspirants willing to head a party and compete for the singularly important public office of the
presidency than the number of parties that would otherwise be sustained on the basis of parliamentary
election laws. 
The forces muting this `oversupply= are generally attenuated by the barriers to effective
strategic voting and by precisely those things thought to encourage consolidation in presidential
systems -- the coalitional imperatives of winner-take-all-elections and the centrality of the presidency.
Even if a political `player= wants to coalesce with some other competitor to ensure the defeat of
ideological opponents or to extract policy commitments, it is useful, perhaps even necessary, to form
and head a party beforehand. Even for publicly visible persons, that initial visibility must be given
political currency, which in a democracy is votes. But in societies lacking those nonpolitical social
organizations, the only way to lay a claim to any of that currency is to head a party in election.
However, if at the same time, political power if not outright electoral success lies within the grasp
                                         
     8 Notice that since our scenario specifically refers to ideologically similar parties, even relatively numerous permanent
societal cleavages, regardless of their strengths, may not serve a coordinating function either. With low cost of entry, the
uncertainty of transitional elections may stimulate the over-production of parties that target the same constituency, so
that the coordination problem then reappears within population segments.
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of most political elites owing to the general uncertainty of things and the corresponding absence of
any means of quickly directing effective strategic voting, then no current party leader is likely to
sacrifice their position by letting someone else head or otherwise gain too strong a position within
their party. So, absent an intra-party coup, even entering the game of coalitional politics at this time
may require that one form a party of one's own, regardless of whether that party can hope to win
parliamentary seats.
Forming parties as a way to meet presidential aspirations is further encouraged by the `rules
of succession= to presidential office. Candidates for president in established democracies typically
come from lower rungs on the ladder of political power, such as regional governors and national
legislative leaders. But in transitional democracies, there is no such ladder. The constitutional
importance and public visibility of the presidency combines with the fact that these other offices either
do not exist or their relative impotence renders them ineffective stepping stones to the presidency.
Regional political elites such as governors and mayors in the early stages of a transition, even if
directly elected, typically have little national visibility since there may be few opportunities to establish
oneself as an effective administrator or a champion of reform (with respect to Russia, for example,
only two exceptions in the course of six years come to mind: Boris Nemtsov, governor of Nizhny
Novgorod oblast, and most recently, Yurii Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow). Newly formed national
legislatures, moreover, are typically organized around party factions. The identifiable personalities
in them are those who head one of these parties, moreover, anyone who heads a faction is identifiable,
regardless of a membership in government coalitions. With legislative leadership conferred only on
party leaders, using the legislature to secure the visibility necessary for a run at the presidency
requires either prior leadership of some party or the creation of a new party, possibly, by means of
disrupting some preexisting party within the legislature. Thus, although the structure of parliamentary
elections may influence the extent of party fragmentation and the pace of consolidation, competition
for the presidency adds its own weight to the forces that mold the party system. And in the early
stages of that development, when other features of democracy such as legislative organizational
structure and alternative paths to public visibility are underdeveloped, the weight of the presidency
acts to encourage party proliferation.
Notice, though, that even if we accept these explanations for the regression coefficients for
P reported in Tables 1 and 2, these arguments do not close the door on a number of possibilities
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concerning the precise nature of the impact of presidentialism on party fragmentation. For example,
although presidential elections might attenuate the consolidating impact of parliamentary election laws
so as to yield a general increase in the number of parties, we cannot also preclude the possibility that
popular presidentialism in transitions can negate this impact altogether so as to render those laws
irrelevant. If the latter is the case, a determination of whether presidential elections `increased' or
`decreased' the number of parties will depend on prior expectations and the distribution of cases in
our data.
The several theoretical possibilities, all of which are consistent with the regression coefficients
in Tables 1 and 2, are portrayed in Figure 1. Briefly, curve A is our benchmark and describes the
approximate theoretical relationship observed in established parliamentary democracies between
average district magnitude and the number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). Curve B,
which corresponds to the simple additive linear structure assumed by the regressions in Tables 1 and
2, supposes that presidential prospects merely attenuate whatever consolidating influence
parliamentary representation rules exert on the number of parties so as to yield a uniform increase in
that number. Curves C and D (actually `lines') suppose that the incentives established by
presidentialism wholly overwhelm and negate the impact of parliamentary election laws. But where
D corresponds to a `natural' limit set lower than what we might expect from extreme forms of
proportional representation, line C corresponds to political systems in which presidentialism not only
negates the impact of parliamentary election laws, but also encourages a greater number of `parties'
(actually, candidacies) than what we would ever anticipate under those laws.
Which curve best describes a transitional democracy depends on how direct election of a
president impacts political entrepreneurial decisions. W  would expect C or D to better describe the
data if parliamentary elections serve primarily to build the political infrastructure for a subsequent
presidential race or to demonstrate a party leader's ability to command the loyalty of a sufficient
segment of the electorate and thus his right to be  `heard' in the next presidential election campaign.
The first motivation appears, for instance, to account for General Lebed's participation in Russia's
December 1995 parliamentary election, while the second arguably motivated the radical communist
candidates in Russia that year who wanted to be certain that the `official' Communist Party
presidential candidate, Zyuganov, did not compromise their ideology `merely' to win election. What
is common to both motivations, though, is the relative lack of consideration given to winning
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legislative seats. Curve B, on the other hand, becomes the better descriptor if the parliamentary
election law drives the overall number of parties but more parties exist than we would expect in
equilibrium because the incentive to compete for the presidency slows down the process of coalition
formation among competing elites.
3. The Empirical Evidence
Before ascertaining which curve best describes the countries in our sample, it is worthwhile
to look back at the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 to comment on some patterns here that contrast with
earlier analyses. First, consider the last regression reported in each of these tables. Multiplying ln(D)
times H, our measure of social (ethnic) heterogeneity (see Appendix), is intended to model the idea
that the effects of increased district magnitude on the number of parties are more likely to be felt in
socially heterogeneous states than in homogeneous ones. That is, if D i  large, then parties that cater
to specific minorities have greater incentive to form and less incentive to coalesce with other parties.
Elsewhere, in fact, we show that for established democracies (e.g., Canada, the United States,
Germany, Finland, England, Australia, Netherlands, Iceland, and so on), this model yields a better fit
than does one that merely incorporates H as a linear additive variable or that ignores H alt gether
(Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). But here we see that although the coefficients for Hln(D) are
statistically significant (except when our dependent variable concerns the number of parties winning
seats), such a model for our complete sample (Table 1) is no better in terms of adjusted R2 than one
that ignores heterogeneity altogether, and is strictly worse when we restrict the analysis to Central
Europe (Table 2). There is no indisputable explanation for this pattern, but the most evident
hypothesis is that when democratic process is suddenly thrust upon a society, as it was in so many
of the countries in our sample, parties designed to `serve' or otherwise take advantage of basic social
cleavages coexist with the other parties that form at this time, and that total number greatly surpasses
what can be sustained in equilibrium as a product of the combined influence of a polity's electoral laws
and social cleavages. Although testing such hypotheses lies beyond the scope of the present analysis,
the comparison of our results with earlier studies is consistent with the proposition that it is only in
the later stages of a transition that basic social cleavages such as ethnicity receive full play in a
society's political process; in the early stages of transition it is the gross characteristics of its political
institutions that offer the most relevant (albeit loose) constraint on party proliferation.
15
It is useful also to compare the overall number of parties and the magnitude of coefficients
in our sample of transitional democracies with what is observed in more established democracies. To
do this we first recompute our district magnitude variable in accordance with Taagepera and
Shugart=s (1989) definition of "effective" district magnitude (ED) and run the analogue of the
explanatory relationship they provide for `effective' number of parties. Taagepera and Shugart (1989:
144) provide the estimate
EN = 2.5 + 1.25 ln(ED),
whereas our sample of countries (with variables accordingly redefined) yields,
EN = 3.4 + 1.5 ln(ED).9
Thus, both the intercept and the slope is greater in our sample than Taagepera and Shugart's, which
suggests that, on average at least, the number of parties in our sample of transitional states is greater
and more sensitive to district magnitude than is Taagepera and Shugart's sample. For another
comparison with equivalent implications, consider Lijphart's (1990) regime data, which also pertains
to established democracies. Regressing `effective' number of parties against the log of average district
magnitude yields the equation (see Table 1 in Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994)
EN = 3.24 + .24ln(ADM),
whereas our data here yields the equation
EN = 5.63+ .29ln(ADM).10
Once again, then, we see both a greater intercept and steeper slope for our sample of transitional
countries.
Turning now to an assessment of which curve in Figure 1 best describes our data for countries
with presidential elections, notice that the proper econometric model for distinguishing among curves
B, C and D is the following expression:
NP = a + b1P + b2D + b3DP.11 (1)
                                         
     9 For the definition of >e fective= magnitude (ED) see Taagapera and Shugart (1989: 135). The coefficients for the
Central European subsample (n=28) are 2.7 and 1.7 respectively -- approximately the same intercept as Shugart and
Carey=s, but a steeper slope.
     10 Average district magnitude (ADM) is computed according to Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) definition.
     11 Although the coefficients and R2's in Table 2 suggest that ln(D) rather than D gives better fit, ln(D)P and P are
collinear 7 > .9) and cannot be included in the same equation. P and DP correlate as well (r=.7) because of the string of
16
Thus,
If direct presidential elections yield a uniform increase in the number of competitors (curve
B), then b1 and b2, but not b3, should be positive. But, if the presidency negates the effect of
parliamentary election laws (curves C or D) and establishes a uniform number of parties
regardless of parliamentary district magnitude, then b3  -b2. A d in this case, the higher
curve, C, is the more appropriate descriptor whenever a + b1 is approximately equal to or
greater than 6.9 + .22(25) = 12.4.12
Table 3 gives the estimates for both the full and Central European samples, and the first thing
to notice is that b3, within reasonable statistical bounds, is in fact the negative of b2 even when b3 is
not statistically significant. Second, a + b1 equals 11.3 if we do not accommodate adjustment districts
and equals 10.1 when we do. Thus, although we cannot say that presidentialism yields a uniformly
higher level of party fragmentation for especially large district magnitudes, curve C in Figure 1 seems
to best describe transitional presidential systems.
The regressions here raise a number of questions that, owing to the limitations of our data,
can only be given tentative answers. First, we should ask whether there is any pattern to the residuals
in our regressions and, in particular, whether presidential systems are more or less predictable than
parliamentary ones. To answer this question and to give a better sense of the meaning of our
regression coefficients, their relationship to the curves in Figure 1, and the magnitude of residuals,
Figure 2 graphs the first of the regressions in Table 3.13 Briefly, an examination of residuals reveals
                                                                                                                              
zeros when P = 0. But notice that expression (1) is equivalent to running two separate regressions -- one for each
institutional system. If we do that, then, looking ahead a bit at our conclusions, we get (t-statistics in parentheses)
N = 11.3 (10.9) + .12D (1.1),    adjR2 = .02, (n = 19),
N = 11.0 (8.7) + .75 ln(D) 1.1),    adjR2 = .00, (n = 19)
for countries with presidential elections, whereas for purely parliamentary ones we get
N = 5.5 (4.8) + .34D (5.1),    adjR2 = .58, (n = 15),
N = 4.9 (4.1) + 2.2 ln(D) (4.9),   adjR2 = .55, (n = 15).
Thus, as we subsequently argue, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for D s zero in presidential
systems.
     12 These numbers come from the first regression in Table 1 after setting P = 0 and D = 25, since 25 is the maximum
district magnitude in our sample.
     13 Notice the slight positive slope of the line for presidential systems since in this regression b2 (= .34) is slightly
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a zero correlation between them and P: neither presidential nor parliamentary systems are less
predictable than the other14 Nevertheless, Figure 2 does raise the subsidiary question as to whether
our conclusions could be influenced by one or two specific countries acting as leverage points. Table
4, then, reports two sets of regressions. In the first, we remove Albania from the analysis (the country
that Figure 2 suggests might be a leverage point for parliamentary data), whereas in the second set
we consider the possibility that countries with single member district electoral systems are leverage
points in general, and we remove all observations in which D = 1. Although these exclusions result
in a considerable decrease in adjusted R2, our conclusions about 1, b2, and b3, and the curves that
best represent the relationship between the number of parties and D remain unchanged.
Next, we should ask whether there is any temporal pattern in the data -- is the number of
parties increasing or decreasing over time? Owing to the fact that we have a small number of cases
and that any division into subpopulations precludes meaningful statistical comparisons, we can only
offer a tentative analysis. Nevertheless, if we take the number of parties with more than one percent
of the vote in a parliamentary election and divide that number by D i  that election, we can compare
the number of parties per district seat across elections. More specifically, we make this comparison
for a country=s first and most recent (last) parliamentary election. Table 5 gives the results of such
a comparison and reveals that it is predominantly presidential systems that witness an increase in the
number of parties per district seat.15 The data in this table should not be interpreted to mean,
however, that, with the exceptions of Albania and Latvia, the absolute number of parties increases
only in presidential systems, since our calculations here concern `parties per average seat contested
in a district'. In fact, Table 6, which divides our sample into two time periods, demonstrates that the
number of parties with more than one percent of the vote has increased in both systems.
                                                                                                                              
greater than b3 (= -.22). However, notice also that if we had instead limited our sample to Central Europe and chosen the
`effective number of parties' as our dependent variable, we would see a slightly negatively sloping line.
     14 If we look at residuals more systematically, by identifying observations with studentized residuals in excess of the
2.04 threshold (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsh 1980), all estimated coefficients remain stable with these outliers removed.
     15 Not all countries in our sample are included in this table since several of them have had only one parliamentary
election.
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The comparison Table 6 offers with respect to `effective' number of parties, though, is
perhaps more interesting. Although the absolute number of parties increases in both types of systems,
and although there is a corresponding increase in the `effective' number of parties in parliamentary
systems, in systems with direct presidential elections there is a decreas in the effective' number of
parties that accompanies the increase in their absolute number. This decrease, moreover, becomes
even more pronounced if we exclude Russia (see numbers in parenthesis) -- the only post-Soviet state
in our data set (excepting the Baltics again) with two parliamentary elections. Thus, although the
overall number of parties increases, there is some evidence of consolidation to the extent that votes
in presidential systems appear to concentrate over time on a subset of the parties that compete in
parliamentary elections.
We reiterate that any conclusions we might draw from such a table should be accepted only
tentatively owing to the small number of cases in our analysis. In fact, that number is too small to
allow us to conclude that any of the differences reported here are statistically significant.
Nevertheless, such observation should be taken seriously in that it suggests an interesting difference
in the temporal dynamics of presidential and parliamentary systems. Specifically, it suggests that
consolidation should be thought of as a multidimensional concept that takes into account both the
absolute number of parties and the concentration of votes across them, without combining them in
any single uninformative synthetic measure. Direct presidential elections may indeed encourage the
proliferation of formally organized parties, but they also appear to encourage some concentration of
votes on a smaller subset of parties than when only parliamentary elections are held in a country.
Following the logic described earlier, proliferation is encouraged in a presidential system since
forming and heading parties provides presidential aspirants with the clearest path to that office and
to the national political visibility in a transitional democracy. But at the same time, voters=
coordination is of greater value in the winner-take-all environments, such as when presidential
elections are a part of a general electoral system. And some, albeit modest, degree of strategic voting
seem to develop when parties offer less than reliable strategic leadership to their constituencies and
cannot be fully trusted in campaigns. This leads if not to explicit coalition formation, then to the
`washing out= of parties that are less successful in previous contests so as to reduce their `effective'
number.
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As an additional check on these conclusions, Table 7 reports three pairs of numbers that
contrast presidential and parliamentary systems. The first column of data gives the average number
of registered parties, the second gives the overall average `effective' number of parties, the third
column--the average percentage of parties the get at least 1 percent of the vote but no parliamentary
seats, and the last column gives the average percentage of `wasted votes' -- vote going to parties that
win no seats. The story each of these columns tells is consistent with the supposition that the greater
fragmentation of parties in presidential systems can be attributed to the incentive to form a party
merely to support one's presidential aspirations rather than win parliamentary seats. As Table 7
shows, systems where presidents are directly elected not only have, on average, more parties than the
purely parliamentary ones, they have fewer `significant' parties that capture parliamentary seats.
4. Conclusions
Despite presidentialism's poor record with respect to political stability, many transitional
democracies will insist on this governmental form. Some will argue that a purely parliamentary
government cannot efficiently direct a simultaneous transition to democracy and a market economy.
Others will adopt this form merely because some tank commander followed a president's orders rather
than parliament's (as in Russia in 1993). And still others will move to this form because, as in Belarus,
a national referendum on the issue was manipulated by a sitting president to serve his own purposes.
But if arguments over which form of government is best are unlikely to influence choices, one could,
at least, look for influences capable of alleviating the disturbing propensity of direct presidential
elections to boost political fragmentation during transitions.
The observations we offer in this essay, tentative as they might be, provide some suggestions
for institutional design along these lines. We can begin by noting that the problem with combining
presidentialism and extreme multipartism derives in part from the difficulty of sustaining a legislative
majority that can pass a president=s programs or offer constructive revisions without engaging in a
destructive struggle for power (Jones 1995, Mainwaring 1990). We suspect, though, that the problem
is not multipartism per se, but rather th , absent a coherent party system, the electoral fates of
presidents and legislators are insufficiently interdependent. And this is while in stable democracies,
both parliamentary and presidential, there exists a symbiotic relationship between an elected president
and a major parliamentary party -- a relationship in which members of one branch of government has
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an incentive to see members of the other branch operate with some minimal level of efficiency and
success.16 However, a democracy will be less endowed with these incentives to the extent that direct
presidential elections encourage the formation of parties that have only a marginal interest in winning
legislative seats because they exist primarily to facilitate individual presidential ambitions. And it is
this under-endowment that too easily characterizes a transitional presidential democracy.
Several institutional parameters contribute to this circumstance. First, the constitutions of
several states in our analysis (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, and Estonia) all require that presidents
suspend their partisanship during their terms of office, while Russian election law prohibits the
president (or any other elected official not running for office) from campaigning on behalf of or
endorsing a party. Such rules might be appropriate for a society in which the president plays the role
of monarch or czar. But they are dysfunctional when a president is merely a temporarily elected public
official who must contemplate or assist putting together majority coalitions in parliament that would
approve his programs and who must subject himself to the rigors of an election campaign if he wishes
to extend his term of office. Constitutional or legal provisions that bar presidents from party politics
must necessarily impede arty consolidation.
Second, all of the presidential systems in our analysis elect presidents using majority rule with
a runoff. The argument for choosing this rule over simple plurality rule is the fear that plurality rule
will elect someone with too small share of the vote to confer legitimacy on the victory. The problem
with this argument, though, is that by artificially manufacturing majorities (on a second ballot), we
enhance the likelihood that no one will secure a majority on the first ballot. Runoffs encourage party
fragmentation and the formation of `parties' whose primary goal is to exert influence prior to the
second round of voting. We suspect, in fact, that the best way to ensure a majority winner is to avoid
explicitly imposing such a requirement on the outcome.
Third, only Bulgaria makes provision for a vice president. Despite the instinct to deride this
seemingly inherently impotent office, the choice of a vice presidential running mate can facilitate the
building of electoral coalitions both across parties and across branches of government. The office may
be impotent in terms of exerting power as in many cases might be the presidency itself, but, if the
                                         
     16 For an elaboration of this argument in the context of ensuring stable federal relations see Ordeshook and
Shvetsova (1997).
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history of the United States is any guide, its existence can provide presidential candidates with an
important bargaining chip for engineering electoral coalitions that meld parties formed around specific
personalities.
The arguments others offer about the arrangements most destructive of stability under
presidentialism, if not explicitly  supported by our analysis, are at least not inconsistent with it.
Mainwaring (1990) and Shugart and Carey (1992), in particular, focus on the timing of elections and
the extent to which parliamentary election rules themselves encourage party fragmentation. Of cou se,
it might seem that our analysis contradicts both parts of this argument since we find that in our sample
at least, party fragmentation is greater when elections are simultaneous, and since curve C in Figure
1, which suggests the near-irrelevance of D i  presidential systems, best summarizes our data. With
respect to the issue of simultaneity, we should, of course, keep in mind that parameter estimates here
are not statistically different; nor can we exclude the possibility that the influence of simultaneity
requires more than one election cycle. More generally, it may be a combination of things that renders
any one thing such as district magnitude seemingly irrelevant in a comparative statistical analysis.
There is no reason to suppose, then, that our findings about the near `irrelevance of D' would be
sustained in other institutional environments such as one that allowed for simultaneous presidential
and parliamentary elections, that elected presidents using simple plurality rule, or that made
accommodation for the office of vice president.
We can, of course, continue to speculate about other alternative institutional configurations
for presidentialism, but doing so takes us far beyond the limits of our analysis and the conclusions we
can legitimately draw from it. It is sufficient merely to note that, as an addendum to Mainwaring=s,
and Shugart and Carey=s findings about the arrangements most likely to yield political instability under
presidentialism that direct election itself, at least in the especially vulnerable transition to democracy,
can have its own, independent effect on party factionalism, and that designing a stable presidential
system requires taking this independent effect into account and finding ways to circumvent or
otherwise mute it.
Dependent variable: N =
# parties with > 1% of voteEffective #of partiesIndependent variables





















































Ln(D) - - 2.1
(3.3)
*
- - - 1.6
(4.1)*
-















H*ln(D) - - - 1.1
(3.1)
*
- - - 0.8
(3.1)*
Adjusted R2 .36 .42 .41 .41 .19 .23 .32 .32
Table 1: Some simple linear models; Full Sample (n = 34; t-statistics in parenthesis)
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Dependent variable: N =
# parties with > 1% of voteEffective # of partiesIndependent variables




















































Ln(D) - - 3.0
(8.4)
*
- - - 1.7
(3.7)*
-















H*ln(D) - - - 1.5
(6.1)
*
- - - 1.0
(4.3)*
Adjusted R2 .44 .58 .64 .58 .14 .25 .35 .42
Table 2: Some simple linear models; Central European countries only (n = 28)
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Dependent variable: N =
# parties with > 1% of vote Effective # of parties
full sample Central Europe
only













































































adj. R2 .40 .50 .46 .67 .20 .27 .23 .42
Table 3: Regressions conforming to expression (1), t-statistics in parenthesis
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Dependent variable: N =
Without Albania, n=31 Without SMD electoral systems, n=29
# parties with
> 1% of vote
Effective # of
parties















































adj. R2 .29 .11 .32 .20
















































1990-93 11.9 (12.0) 7.4 (7.3) 10 8.8 4.6 9
1994-96 13.4 (12.3) 6.8 (6.0) 5 10.8 5.8 6











presidential elections 39.6 7.1 5.7 21.6
Countries without direct
presidential elections 20.3 5.1 3.7 11.8
Table 7: Some comparisons between presidential and parliamentary systems
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Appendix:
Elections in Centeral and Eastern Europe



































                                         




Dependent variable: B cause we seek institutional explanations of the shape of developing
party systems, our dependent variable is the number of political parties that are at least somewhat
electorally successful. In the case of Ukraine in 1994, we estimate the vote cast for parties on the
basis of party affiliation since no official data on party vote shares exists. Votes cast for independent
candidates are ignored. However, there is more than one way to calculate this number.  Rae (1971),
Taagepera and Shugart (1989), and Lijphart (1994) all use the `effective number' of parties, equal to
the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares (or seat shares) of individual parties. The intuition
behind such a measure is that not all parties should count equally; in particular, the weaker ones
should count as less than a full party because of their low political influence. But it is possible that
winning a single legislative seat or merely becoming visible during a parliamentary contest may be a
sufficient motivation for a party's formation. Thus, we could also simply count the number of parties
on the ballot regardless of their level of support. In the extreme, though, this approach may merely
measure the relative ease of registering a party. As a compromise, we focus on parties that receive
at least 1% of the total vote.
Independent variables: The mode of presidential selection: In all cases considered, a
country's constitution states whether a president is to be directly or indirectly elected. But some
exceptions were made for the first election. For example, although Estonian presidents are to be
elected by parliament, the president in 1993 was elected directly, so we record Estonia in 1993 (but
not in 1995) as a country with direct presidential elections. Also, even though the president at the
time of the 1991 elections in Bulgaria was elected by parliament, direct elections lay only a few
months in the future. Thus, we code the 1991 Bulgarian data as the one with a directly elected
president. We code Moldova as presidential even though its first presidential election was non-
competitive. The mode of presidential selection is a zero-one variable, which is 1 if the president is
directly elected, and 0 if the president is elected by the parliament or if there is no president.   Dist ict
magnitude is a variable set equal either to the average magnitude of a primary electoral district
(ADM) (the average number of seats awarded per electoral district) or to the inverse of the legal
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threshold, T, for parliamentary representation. The criterion of what component is binding is based
on how much the parameter restricts the maximum feasible number of parties. Our district magnitude
variable D, then, is defined as D = min {ADM, 100%/T }. For two-ballot systems our data are limited
to the party list PR portion of the ballot, since complete partisan data do not exist in most cases for
single-member district races. Thus, average magnitude of a primary district is the average number of
seats in a PR district, with the number of single-member districts not included in the calculation. An
exception was made for Armenia and Albania, where single-member districts dominate the electoral
system and a small PR component is little more than an adjustment district. When we address the
impact of the single-member district component on multipartism (footnote 4), it is found to have an
insignificant negative effect, while the significance of our other variables is not diminished. Some
regressions also consider the ln(D) to accommodate the argument of a marginally diminishing impact
of increased district magnitude (Sartori 1976) and to render our analysis consistent with earlier
studies (see, for instance, Taagapera and Shugart, 1989,  Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994).
Adjustment districts: This is another zero-one variable, which takes the value of 1 if
additional seats are provided nationally for allocation among the under-represented parties as in
Hungary. If no national adjustment district exists, this variable is set at 0.
Ethnic Heterogeneity: This variable is computed the same way as `effective number of parties'
except that here we use each country's corresponding ethnic composition.
Data Sources
Our electoral statistics and descriptions of election systems come from a variety of
sources. Specifically: Report of the State Commission of National Elections of Albania
(unpublished), April 1992; Stephen Ashley "Bulgaria."  Electoral Studies (1990) 9(4):312-8;
Adolf Bibic, AThe Emergence of Pluralism in Slovenia,@ Communist and Post- Communist
Studies, (December 1993), 26(4):367-86; Brokl Lubomir and Zdenka Mansfeldova,
ACzechoslovakia@, European Journal of Political Research (1993) 24: 397-410; Bulletin of
Electoral Statistics, Poland, East European Politics and Societies, (1993) 7(3): 569-76; Henry
Carey, AIrregularities or Rigging: the 1992 Romanian Parliamentary Elections,@ East Eur pean
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Case Study of Democratic Consolidation,@ East European Politics and Societies (Winter 1995),
9(1); Leonard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia=s disintegration and Balkan politics in
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Parliamentary Election of 1993". Electoral Studies, (1994), 13(1): 83-6; International Foundation
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in Bulgaria," Political Geography (1995) 14(3): 241-58; Kimmo Kuusela, "The Founding
Electoral Systems in East Europe, 1989-91." In Democratization in Eastern Europe, ed. Geoffrey
Pridham and Vanhanen Tatu, London: Routledge, 1994; T.T. Mackie AGener l El ctions in
Western Nations during 1990", European Journal of Political Research (1992), 21: 317-32;
Darian Malova ASlovakia@.  European Journal of Political Research (1995) 28: 359-368; Axel
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